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THE EXPENSE OF EXPANSION: JUDICIAL 
INNOVATION AT THE SPECIAL  
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
Erik Stier* 
Abstract: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is a hybrid interna-
tional tribunal tasked with prosecuting and punishing those responsible 
for the 2005 bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri. As the first international tribunal to try purely domestic crimes, 
the STL is a unique judicial body that employs a number of novel proce-
dures. One such procedural rule allowed the STL Pre-Trial Judge to sub-
mit questions on applicable law to the Appeals Chamber prior to confirm-
ing any indictments. Responding in the form of an interlocutory deci-
sion, the Appeals Chamber made the groundbreaking assertion that 
customary international law on terrorism had finally emerged, and that it 
stood to impact provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code, which the tri-
bunal was mandated to apply. 
Introduction 
 In a provocative interlocutory decision issued on February 16, 
2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) became the first court to 
recognize customary international law1 on terrorism.2 But on its path to 
declaring a definition that has eluded the international community for 
                                                                                                                      
* Erik Stier is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Re-
view. 
1 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
T.S. 993 (defining international custom, for the purposes of the International Court of 
Justice). In addition to general principles of law and treaties, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) considers custom, “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” a source 
of international law. Id. To illustrate the growth of customary law, Charles de Visscher 
compared it “to the gradual formation of a road across vacant land.” Malcolm N. Shaw, 
International Law 79 (2008)(“After an initial uncertainty as to direction, the majority of 
users begin to follow the same line which becomes a single path . . . accepted as the only 
regular way . . . .”). 
2 See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Leb. Appeals Chamber, Case No. 
STL–11–01/1 ¶ 83, Disposition ¶ 15 (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/ 
stl-11–01/rule-176bis/filings/orders-and-decisions/appeals-chamber/f0010. 
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nearly a century,3 the STL Appeals Chamber exceeded the bounds of 
the tribunal’s fundamental mandate to apply Lebanese law.4 Moreover, 
the court’s decision to resort to customary law on terrorism was unnec-
essary, its justification grounded in contentious methodology, and its 
pronouncement on applicable law expansive.5 
 Article 2 of the STL founding statute (Article 2) instructs the court 
to apply the provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code to the prosecu-
tion and punishment of terrorism.6 The relevant provision of the Leb-
anese Criminal Code, Article 314, is unambiguous and does not require 
interpretation per se.7 Yet as a means to introduce international law, 
the court employed a pre-textual approach that considered sources of 
interpretation prior to considering the plain meaning of the statute.8 In 
other words, the court’s interpretive methodology opened the door to 
its definition of terrorism under customary law.9 
 After diverting to define an international crime of terrorism, the 
court then overstepped the bounds of its Article 2 mandate by applying 
an international interpretation of the Lebanese Code over the clear 
interpretive guide found in Lebanese case law.10 Consequently, the tri-
                                                                                                                      
3 See id. ¶; Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept 
in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 23, 35–36 (2006) (noting that the international community has been at-
tempting to reach agreement on the definition of terrorism since the issue first appeared 
before the League of Nations in 1937). After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
Nations (U.N.) Security Council stated that “acts of international terrorism constitute one 
of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century.” 
S.C. Res. 1377, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001). An accepted definition of 
international terrorism would improve international cooperation and strengthen coalition 
building against perpetrators and sponsors of terrorist acts. Young, supra, at 32. 
4 See S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007); Mat-
thew Gillett & Matthias Schuster, Fast-track Justice: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Defines 
Terrorism, 9 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 989, 1001 (2011). 
5 See Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 998–99, 1003; Stefan Kirsch & Anna Oeh-
michen, Judges Gone Astray: The Fabrication of Terrorism as an International Crime by the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, Durham L.R. (May 13, 2011), 6, http://durhamlawreview.co.uk/ 
attachments/article/26/Judges gone astray.pdf. 
6 S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 4, Attachment art. 2. 
7 See Kirsch & Oehmichen, supra note 5, at 6. 
8 SeeGillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 1000–01; Kirsch & Oehmichen, supra note 5, at 6; 
Ben Saul, Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon In-
vents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism, 24 Leiden J. Int’l L. 677, 680 (2011). 
9 See Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 1006–07; Saul, supra note 8, at 679. 
10 See Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶¶ 51–52 (noting that Lebanese 
case law on this issue establishes a strict reading of the Lebanese Criminal Code); Kai Am-
bos, Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism Under 
International Law?, 24 Leiden J. Int’l L. 655, 658–59 (2011) (“[D]eference to the sover-
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bunal’s approach expanded the scope of the Lebanese provision to en-
compass liability not previously found in domestic law.11 Trials under 
these charges now risk violating the fundamental principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, which holds that persons should be tried or punished 
only for an act considered a criminal offense under applicable law at 
the time it was committed.12 
 The STL’s effort to develop international customary law thus 
comes at great expense.13 In pursuit of an international definition of 
terrorism, the court has provided solid grounds for appeal that threaten 
to undermine its own trial decisions.14 
 Part I of this Comment provides a background of the formation of 
the STL and the unconventional procedures that guided it towards 
recognition of customary international law on terrorism. Part II exam-
ines the tribunal’s methodology and application of international law as 
an interpretive aide to Lebanese law. Part III shows that the STL’s defi-
nition of terrorism is the product of these unusual constructs and ar-
gues that the dramatic expansion of scope threatens to compromise the 
integrity of forthcoming decisions. 
I. Background 
 On February 14, 2005, a massive explosion killed former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri when a car bomb detonated in central Bei-
rut.15 The blast killed nine others and injured dozens more.16 In re-
sponse to a request from the Lebanese government, the United Na-
tions (U.N.) Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Leb-
anon on May 30, 2007.17 
                                                                                                                      
eignty of Lebanon [is] explicitly demanded in Resolution 1757.”);Gillett & Schuster, supra 
note 4, at 1003. 
11 See Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 130. 
12 See Ambos, supra note 10, at 661; Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 1003. 
13 See Ambos, supra note 10, at 661; Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 1003; Saul, supra 
note 8, at 699. 
14 See S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 4, Attachment art. 26 (delineating the court’s appel-
late procedures); Ambos, supra note 10, at 661; Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 1003; 
Saul, supra note 8, at 699. 
15 See Explosion Kills Former Lebanon PM, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/4263893.stm (last updated Feb. 14, 2005, 19:31 GMT). 
16 Id. 
17 S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 4, Annex pmbl. 
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 The STL was set up as a hybrid tribunal18 with the primary task of 
prosecuting and punishing those responsible for the Hariri attack.19 
But the Hariri bombing proved to be just the first of many similar at-
tacks on Lebanese politicians.20 Accordingly, the STL’s jurisdiction can 
be extended beyond the Hariri attack if the tribunal decides that other 
attacks occurring between October 1, 2004 and December 12, 2005 
were connected to the Hariri bombing.21 Crimes taking place after De-
cember 12, 2005 may also fall under the jurisdiction of the STL, if joint-
ly decided by the Lebanese government and the U.N. and approved by 
the Security Council.22 
 Article 2 of the Security Council statute establishing the tribunal 
requires the STL to apply the “provisions of the Lebanese Criminal 
Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, 
crimes and offences against life and personal integrity . . . .”23 Accord-
ingly, the STL trials mark the first instance of an international criminal 
court trying persons accused of violating purely domestic, and not in-
ternational, criminal law.24 
 Before issuing its interlocutory decision, the court was occupied 
with administrative operations and establishing its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (RPE).25 Although mandated to apply Lebanese law,26 a 
pair of procedures in the RPE allowed the STL to incorporate interna-
tional law without violating the parameters of applicable law set out in 
Article 2.27 
 Rule 68(G) of the RPE provides that the Pre-Trial Judge may sub-
mit to the Appeals Chamber any preliminary questions regarding ap-
                                                                                                                      
18 Matthew Gillett & Matthias Schuster, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Kicks Off: The 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Swiftly Adopts Its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 7 J. Int’l Crim. 
Just., 885, 886 (2009). The STL is a hybrid tribunal in the sense that it is an international 
court primarily applying domestic national law. Id. Though seated in the Netherlands, the 
tribunal it is composed of both Lebanese and international judges, as well as a mixed Leb-
anese and international staff. Id. 
19 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 14. 
20 See Timeline: Lebanon Assassinations, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middle 
east/2012/10/2012101921429610991.html (last modified Oct. 20, 2012). 
21 S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 4, Annex art. 1. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Attachment art. 2. 
24 Marco Milanovic, An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1139, 1139 (2007). 
25 See generally Gillett & Schuster, supra note 18, at 885–909 (discussing the STL’s proc-
ess of forming its Rules of Procedure and Evidence). 
26 S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 4, Attachment art. 2. 
27 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶¶ 7, 129. 
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plicable law it deems necessary to rule on an indictment.28 Rule 176 bis 
is the counterpart to Rule 68(G), providing that the Appeals Chamber 
must issue an interlocutory decision on any question raised by the Pre-
Trial Judge.29 Through this mechanism, the Appeals Chamber estab-
lished the substantive law to be applied by the Trial Chamber.30 And 
because this procedure took place prior to the Trial Chamber’s con-
firmation of the first indictment, the Appeals Chamber necessarily 
made final pronouncements on applicable law in the abstract, without 
reference to facts.31 
 These procedures mark a departure from other recent hybrid tri-
bunals.32 Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), ruled against such advisory processes.33 International criminal 
tribunals traditionally limit the appellate role to affirming, reversing, 
and revising decisions of the trial chamber.34 The STL splits from this 
model, granting the Appeals Chamber an advisory role in addition to 
its corrective one.35 
 Such practice is unconventional, as the tribunal itself acknowl-
edges.36 No other international court or tribunal allows a higher court 
to issue an interpretation of substantive law applicable in criminal pro-
ceedings pending before a lower court.37 This unique procedure al-
lowed the Appeals Chamber to expound on questions of law that may 
never come before it.38 
 Taking advantage of this procedure, the STL Pre-Trial Judge sub-
mitted 15 questions to the Appeals Chamber when it received the first 
indictment on January 17, 2011.39 Most significant were three questions 
relating to the substantive crime of terrorism to be applied by the Trial 
Chamber: 
                                                                                                                      
28 Id. ¶ 1. 
29 Spec. Trib. for Leb. R. P and Evid. ¶ 176 bis, http://www.stl-tsl.org/images/RPE/ 
RPE_EN_February_2012.pdf (last amended Feb. 8, 2012). 
30 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 7. 
31 Id. ¶ 8. 
32 See Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 996. 
33 Id. 
34Id. at 992. 
35Id. 
36 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 8. 
37 Gillett & Schuster, supra note 4, at 996. 
38 Id. at 997. See Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 8. 
39 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 1. 
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 i) Taking into account the fact that Article 2 of the Statute 
refers exclusively to the relevant provisions of the Lebanese 
Criminal Code in order to define the notion of terrorist acts, 
should the Tribunal also take into account the relevant appli-
cable international law? 
 ii) Should the question raised in paragraph i) receive a pos-
itive response, how, and according to which principles, may 
the definition of the notion of terrorist acts set out in Article 2 
of the Statute be reconciled with international law? In this 
case, what are the constituent elements, intentional and mate-
rial, of this offense? 
 iii) Should the question raised in paragraph i) receive a 
negative response, what are the constituent elements, material 
and intentional, of the terrorist acts that must be taken into 
consideration by the Tribunal, in the light of Lebanese law 
and case law pertaining thereto?40 
 Pursuant to Rule 176 bis, the Appeals Chamber addressed these 
questions in its interlocutory decision.41 This allowed the Appeals 
Chamber to determine the impact of international law on the appli-
cable law of the STL.42 Moreover, these questions led directly to the 
Appeals Chamber’s pronouncement on the existence of customary 
international law on terrorism.43 
II. Discussion 
 As indicated by the Pre-Trial Judge’s questions, Article 2’s mandate 
to apply Lebanese criminal law raises fundamental concerns about the 
relevance of international law to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon pro-
ceedings.44 In establishing the applicable law, Article 2 refers only to the 
Lebanese Criminal Code, and makes no mention of international law 
at all.45 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. ¶ 42. 
41 Spec. Trib. for Leb. R. P. and Evid. ¶ 176 bis; Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–
11–01/1, ¶ 43. 
42 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 45. 
43 See id. ¶ 85. 
44 See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Leb. Appeals Chamber, Case No. 
STL–11–01/1 ¶ 42, (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11–01/rule-
176bis/filings/orders-and-decisions/appeals-chamber/f0010. 
45 See S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 4, Attachment art. 2. 
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 The Appeals Chamber stated that in accordance with Article 2, the 
tribunal would “apply the provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code, 
and not those of international treaties ratified by Lebanon or custom-
ary international law to define the crime of terrorism.”46 It then pro-
ceeded to justify the use of international law not through direct appli-
cation, but as an interpretive aide.47 
 The foundation of its interpretive approach rests on the assertion 
that all adjudication, regardless of a statute’s clarity, requires interpreta-
tion.48 Instead of applying interpretation to specific ambiguities in do-
mestic statutes, the Appeals Chamber embraced a broad method by 
which all domestic legislation would be construed within the parameters 
of binding international obligations.49 Thus international law, composed 
of ratified treaties and customary law, constitutes part of the legal context 
relevant to consideration of any domestic statutory language.50 Under 
this methodology, the court remains within the boundaries of Article 2 
because it is not applying international law, but merely interpreting Leb-
anese law in light of it.51 
 The Appeals Chamber considered treaty law and customary law as 
interpretive guides before setting out the applicable reading of Article 
314.52 Both treaty law and the Appeals Chamber’s definition of terror-
ism under customary law exhibit broader definitions of terrorism than 
the Lebanese provision.53 
A. The Definition of Terrorism in Treaty Law Binding on Lebanon 
 The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (Arab 
Convention) is the sole treaty ratified by Lebanon that provides a gen-
eral definition of terrorism.54 That convention, designed to encourage 
judicial cooperation, emphasizes that it does not intend to replace con-
                                                                                                                      
46 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 44. 
47 Id. ¶ 45. 
48 See id. ¶ 19. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. ¶¶ 40, 46. 
51 Id. ¶ 45. 
52 See Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 129. 
53 See id. ¶¶ 129–130. 
54 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, League of Arab States, Apr. 22, 
1998, reprinted in International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Sup-
pression of International Terrorism, at 179, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.2; Interlocutory 
Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 63. 
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tracting parties’ national terrorism laws.55 Article 1(2) of the Arab Con-
vention provides the following definition of terrorist acts: 
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, 
that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective 
criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, 
causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or 
security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the envi-
ronment or to public or private installations or property or to 
occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national 
resources (sic).56 
 The Arab Convention definition is broad because it does not re-
quire that an act employ particular means to be considered an act of 
terrorism.57 Article 2(b) of the convention further expands the scope of 
Article 1(2) by providing that attacks on individual government officials 
are considered terrorist acts and not political offenses.58 
B. The Definition of Terrorism in Customary International Law 
 Moving to customary international law, the court asserted that 
consensus on the definition of terrorism had finally emerged.59 Con-
ceding that scholars, legal experts, and even the STL Prosecution and 
Defense Offices held that no definition of terrorism exists, the Appeals 
Chamber nonetheless declared that customary law on terrorism in time 
of peace had crystalized.60 The finding additionally stands to leave a 
broad and binding impact on all subjects of international law.61 
 Deriving a general practice accepted as law from treaties, U.N. res-
olutions, and the legislative and judicial practices of States, the Appeals 
Chamber held that customary law on the international crime of terror-
ism in time of peace comprises three core elements: 
(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kid-
napping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening 
such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the popula-
                                                                                                                      
55 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 54, art. 3; Interlocu-
tory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 64. 
56 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 54, art. 1. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. arts. 2(c), (d), (e). 
59 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 83. 
60 Id. ¶¶ 83, 85. 
61 Id. ¶ 102. 
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tion (which would generally entail the creation of public dan-
ger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international 
authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) 
when the act involves a transnational element.62 
 Like the Arab Convention definition, the Appeals Chamber’s defi-
nition of terrorism under customary international law is broad because 
it lacks a means requirement.63 
C. The Definition of Terrorism in the Lebanese Criminal Code 
 Turning to Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, the differ-
ences between terrorism as defined in international law and Lebanese 
law become clear.64 As the tribunal noted, “Article 314 . . . states: Ter-
rorist acts are all acts intended to cause a state of terror and committed 
by means liable to create a public danger such as explosive devices, in-
flammable materials, toxic or corrosive products and infectious or mi-
crobial agents.”65 The Lebanese Code’s concept of means liable to cre-
ate a public danger distinguishes it from the definitions of terrorism in 
treaty and customary law.66 The inclusion of the term “such as” indi-
cates that the Lebanese Criminal Code does not intend the enumer-
ated list to be exhaustive, but requires that to be considered a terrorist 
act, the act must be committed by a particular class of means—those 
inherently liable to create a public danger.67 
 The Arab Convention differs from the Lebanese Code by provid-
ing a broader definition of terrorism.68 It does not include an enumer-
ated list of means and is further broadened by encompassing individual 
attacks on government officials.69 Yet in other respects it is narrower 
than its Lebanese counterpart—it requires that a terrorist act actually 
be violent as opposed to merely intending to cause a public danger.70 
 The definition of terrorism under customary international law is 
also broader than the Lebanese provision.71 Like the Arab Convention, 
customary law provides no enumerated means by which a terrorist act 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. ¶ 85. 
63 See id.; Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 54, art. 1. 
64 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 113. 
65 Id. ¶ 47. 
66 Id. ¶ 129. 
67 Id. ¶ 50; Kirsch & Oehmichen, supra note 5, at 6. 
68 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 69. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. ¶ 70. 
71 Id. ¶ 113. 
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may be committed.72 Instead, it incorporates—but does not require—  
the creation of public danger within the intent element.73 In necessitat-
ing that an act be committed with “the intent [either] to spread fear 
among the population (which would generally entail the creation of 
public danger) or . . . coerce a national or international authority” the 
court’s definition encompasses a much broader scope of liability than 
Article 314.74 
D. The Definition of Terrorism Applied by the Appeals Chamber 
 Having established its interpretive aides, the Appeals Chamber 
held that for the purposes of the tribunal, Article 314 of the Lebanese 
Criminal Code would be read to contain the following elements: “a. the 
volitional commission of an act; b. through means that are liable to cre-
ate a public danger; and c. the intent of the perpetrator to cause a state 
of terror.”75 Though employed only for the purposes of interpretation, 
these expansive definitions of terrorism in international law broaden 
the scope of the Lebanese provision by eliminating the required use of 
the type of means envisioned in Article 314.76 
 The Appeals Chamber was not mandated to bring the Lebanese 
provision closer in line with its interpretation of international law.77 Its 
expansion of the means requirement was guided by its understanding 
of how Lebanese law uses international law in the interpretation of its 
criminal code.78 
 But Lebanese courts have interpreted their terrorism provision 
differently.79 Lebanese case law has consistently used a narrow interpre-
tation, holding that although the enumerated list of means is not ex-
haustive, it is limited to those likely to create a danger to the general 
public per se.80 The Appeals Chamber noted the clarity of the Lebanese 
interpretation, stating that “[t]he means or implements which under 
this approach are not envisaged in Article 314 include [means such as] 
a gun, a semi-automatic or automatic machine gun, a revolver, or a 
                                                                                                                      
72 See id. ¶ 85. 
73 See id. 
74 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 85. 
75 Id. ¶ 147 
76 Id. ¶¶ 45, 130. 
77 Saul, supra note 8, at 679. 
78 Id.; See Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 46. 
79 Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶¶ 52–55. 
80 Id. ¶ 52. 
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knife and perhaps even a letter-bomb.”81 Domestic courts have further 
demonstrated their interpretation of the means element by categoriz-
ing acts utilizing unenumerated means simply as murder.82 
 Although numerous cases examined by the Appeals Chamber es-
tablish the narrow interpretation of the Lebanese courts, the Appeals 
Chamber made a deliberate choice to interpret Article 314 broadly to 
more closely align it with international law.83 It openly acknowledged 
the broadening effect such an interpretation would have on criminal 
liability.84 
III. Analysis 
 The Appeals Chamber’s expansion of Article 314 is the problem-
atic result of a flawed process of appellate overreach.85 By choosing to 
interpret Article 314 broadly, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon took an 
unjustified departure from the guide of Lebanese courts and the man-
date of the STL statute.86 As the jurisdiction of the STL grows to en-
compass additional attacks, these concerns are quickly becoming far 
less abstract.87 
 The assassination of Rafik Hariri was the most prominent attack on 
Lebanese politicians, but it was not an isolated incident.88 Other attacks 
on Lebanese officials that have come under the jurisdiction of the STL 
demonstrate the immediacy of the Appeal Chamber’s decision.89 
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. 
82 Id. ¶¶ 52–53. The court enumerates, by way of example, two cases. Id. In Homicide of 
Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi, the Judicial Council of the Lebanese Republic held that although 
the Sheikh was gunned down in a crowded street and for ideological reasons, the assassina-
tion was not an act of terrorism because the assailants did not utilize means enumerated in 
Article 314. Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11/01/1, ¶ 52. Similarly, in Homicide of 
Engineer Dany Chamoun, the same court held that the killing of Chamoun, his wife, and 
their two children was properly considered murder and not an act of terrorism because it 
was committed with automatic weapons and not any of the means listed in Article 314. 
Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶ 53. 
83 See Interlocutory Decision, Case No. STL–11–01/1 ¶¶ 52–53, 129–130. 
84 Id. ¶ 130. 
85 See Kirsch & Oehmichen, supra note 5, at 6; Saul, supra note 8, at 679. 
86 See Kirsch & Oehmichen, supra note 5, at 6. 
87 See Press Release, Special Tribunal for Leb., Pre-Trial Judge Rules on Connected 
Cases (Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-releases/19–08–
2011-pre-trial-judge-rules-on-connected-cases; Timeline: Lebanon Assassinations, supra note 
20. 
88 See Timeline: Lebanon Assassinations, supra note 20. 
89 See Press Release, Special Tribunal for Leb., supra note 87; Beirut Bomb Targets Top Min-
ister, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4674441.stm (last updated July 
12, 2005); Blast Kills Lebanese Politician, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ 
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 On October 1, 2004, a car bomb explosion injured former Leba-
nese Cabinet member Marwan Hamadeh and killed his driver.90 An-
other car bomb killed Former Communist Party leader George Hawi 
on June 21, 2005.91 Elias Murr, former Lebanese Defence Minister, sur-
vived a bombing on July 12, 2005.92 An assassin shot Minister of Indus-
try Pierre Gemayel at point blank range on November 21, 2006, killing 
him as he stepped out of his car.93 
 The STL has already extended its jurisdiction to the prosecution of 
the attacks on Hamadeh, Hawi, and Murr.94 It may soon also encom-
pass the Gemayel killing.95 Should the tribunal extend jurisdiction to 
the Gemayel assassination—distinct among the attacks for its use of a 
gun as opposed to an explosive—its expansion of the means element 
could violate a fundamental rule against retroactive punishment.96 Un-
der Lebanese interpretation of Article 314 of their Criminal Code, a 
targeted attack by gunfire is not considered creation of public danger 
and therefore is not an act of terrorism.97 Under the new STL defini-
tion, however, criminal liability for an act of terrorism may attach.98 
 The expansion of liability set out in the interlocutory decision was 
made possible through a series of unconventional procedures, begin-
ning with the inclusion of Rule 68(G).99 Article 26(2) of the STL Stat-
ute limits the role of the Appeals Chamber to the traditional function 
of hearing appeals from parties on errors of law and fact, and grants it 
the power to affirm, reverse, or revise the decisions of the Trial Cham-
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ber.100 The Appeals Chamber’s reasoning that Rule 68(G) improves 
judicial economy is unpersuasive when weighed against the significant 
role it grants itself beyond the plain language of the statute.101 The in-
clusion of Rule 68(G) led not only to the expansion of customary law 
by identifying a new crime of international terrorism, but also to an 
expansion of liability beyond the Lebanese law the tribunal was author-
ized to apply.102 
 After granting itself advisory powers, the Appeals Chamber con-
tinued on its path toward expanding applicable law by inverting the 
traditional method of textual interpretation.103 Instead of first consider-
ing the plain meaning of statutory language, the Appeals Chamber 
turned to context as a means of justifying the introduction of interna-
tional law.104 This approach, which introduced international law into 
the decision, raises questions about the boundary between judicial in-
terpretation and legislation.105 
 While veering into an academic discussion of customary law may 
have been a surprising and superfluous diversion, the application of 
international interpretation over well-established Lebanese interpreta-
tion is an unjustified departure from Article 2.106 The Appeals Chamber 
stated that it would apply Lebanese law as interpreted by Lebanese 
courts unless it found that such an interpretation was “unreasonable, or 
may result in a manifest injustice, or is not consonant with international 
principles and rules binding upon Lebanon.”107 Curiously, it offered 
none of those reasons for choosing to apply international interpreta-
tion over Lebanese interpretation.108 Dedicating just two paragraphs of 
its one hundred-fifty page decision to explain its logic for straying from 
the Lebanese interpretation of its code, the Appeals Chamber simply 
stated that the gravity of the attack, its transnational implications, and 
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the fact that the U.N. Security Council established the tribunal war-
ranted the use of international over Lebanese interpretation.109 
 The practical effect of the Appeals Chamber’s expansion of appli-
cable law on forthcoming STL trials is disconcerting.110 By drastically 
departing from the Lebanese interpretation, the Appeals Chamber has 
provided a compelling basis for challenging terrorism charges as violat-
ing the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, establishing that no person 
should be tried or punished for an act not considered a criminal of-
fense at the time it was committed.111 Nullum crimen sine lege is invoked 
alongside legislative and interpretive principles that oblige criminal 
statutes to be drafted with precision and in a manner that resolves am-
biguities in favor of the accused.112 
 The Appeals Chamber considered this possibility, but held that 
“the principle of legality does not preclude ‘the progressive develop-
ment of the law by the court.’”113 To support its assertion, it cited the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber’s statement that non-codified customary inter-
national law can provide reasonable notice that could entail criminal 
liability.114 But the differences between the mandates of the ICTY and 
the STL weaken the Appeal’s Chamber’s claim.115 While the ICTY was 
tasked to primarily apply customary international law, the STL was es-
tablished to apply Lebanese law.116 Thus in the absence of applicable 
law, customary law may be sufficient to provide notice; but where appli-
cable law is clear, resort to custom is tenuous.117 
 The central question enshrined in the nullum crimen sine lege prin-
ciple is whether an accused party could reasonably foresee that certain 
conduct was criminalized at the time it was committed.118 Even accept-
ing that certain actions constitute acts of terrorism under customary 
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international law, Article 2 requires punishment according to Lebanese 
law; this would treat some crimes falling under the Appeals Chamber’s 
expanded definition, like the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, as homi-
cide.119 
 Conceding that scholars and legal experts of the international 
community, including the STL Defense Office and Prosecutor, con-
tinue to forcefully contend that customary law on terrorism does not 
exist today, accused parties in the tribunal proceedings can hardly be 
expected to have recognized that it would encompass more liability 
than Article 314 in 2005.120 In this context, the Appeals Chamber’s ap-
proach gives rise to a strong nullum crimen sine lege challenge that could 
compromise the legitimacy of forthcoming trials.121 
Conclusion 
 The landmark decision of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a 
fundamentally flawed document. The unwarranted establishment of a 
limited definition of terrorism in time of peace under customary inter-
national law is unlikely to leave a legacy of benefits. While it may stimu-
late discussion and push the international community towards accept-
ing a more comprehensive definition of terrorism in the future, it does 
so at great cost. The Appeals Chamber relied on an unorthodox and 
faulty process to reach its historic pronouncement, setting a dangerous 
precedent for activist international courts. Moreover, by expanding ap-
plicable law beyond the bounds of the tribunal’s founding statute, the 
Appeals Chamber assumed legislative powers never granted to it. As 
such, the interlocutory decision constitutes unjustified judicial over-
reach. That forthcoming rulings may be jeopardized under the nullem 
crimen sine lege principle is a stark reminder that justice and legitimacy 
in the international system demand the strict separation of legislative 
and judicial powers. 
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